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ABSTRACT. Objective: The purpose of this study was to estimate the
independent effects of increases in minimum alcohol prices and densities
of private liquor stores on crime outcomes in British Columbia, Canada,
during a partial privatization of off-premise liquor sales. Method: A
time-series cross-sectional panel study was conducted using mixed
model regression analysis to explore associations between minimum
alcohol prices, densities of liquor outlets, and crime outcomes across 89
local health areas of British Columbia between 2002 and 2010. Archival
data on minimum alcohol prices, per capita alcohol outlet densities,
and ecological demographic characteristics were related to measures of
crimes against persons, alcohol-related trafﬁc violations, and non–alco-
hol-related trafﬁc violations. Analyses were adjusted for temporal and
regional autocorrelation. Results: A 10% increase in provincial mini-
mum alcohol prices was associated with an 18.81% (95% CI: ±17.99%,
p < .05) reduction in alcohol-related trafﬁc violations, a 9.17% (95%
CI: ±5.95%, p < .01) reduction in crimes against persons, and a 9.39%
(95% CI: ±3.80%, p < .001) reduction in total rates of crime outcomes
examined. There was no signiﬁcant association between minimum alco-
hol prices and non–alcohol-related trafﬁc violations (p > .05). Densities
of private liquor stores were not signiﬁcantly associated with alcohol-
involved trafﬁc violations or crimes against persons, though they were
with non–alcohol-related trafﬁc violations. Conclusions: Reductions in
crime events associated with minimum-alcohol-price changes were more
substantial and speciﬁc to alcohol-related events than the countervailing
increases in densities of private liquor stores. The ﬁndings lend further
support to the application of minimum alcohol prices for public health
and safety objectives. (J. Stud. Alcohol Drugs, 76, 628–634, 2015)
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DURING THE PAST CENTURY, government controls inNorth America over the sale and distribution of alcohol
put in place after the National Prohibition era have been
gradually dismantled. At the time of writing, just 18 U.S.
states retain some form of control over the sale and distribu-
tion of alcohol (Hilton, 2013). In Canada, although all 10
provinces retain a government monopoly on the wholesale
distribution of alcohol, only 2 retain a complete monopoly
over retail sales for off-premise consumption, 7 permit al-
cohol sales in both government- and privately owned liquor
stores, and 1 (Alberta) has completely privatized retail sales
(Giesbrecht et al., 2013; Thomas, 2012). The net effect of
this process has usually involved increased numbers of liquor
outlets, longer trading hours, and cheaper prices, along with
measurable increases in alcohol-related harms (Babor et al.,
2010; Holder, 2007).
In some jurisdictions, pricing and taxation measures have
been used to offset anticipated increases in adverse public
health and safety effects of privatization—and to maintain
government revenues. For example,Washington State recently
introduced full privatization of alcohol retail sales alongside
a substantial increase in alcohol taxes. In neighboring British
Columbia (BC), a rapid expansion of private liquor outlets
from a low base was permitted between 2002 and 2006. As a
result, by 2010 the number of private outlets increased from
543 to 1,045 while government outlets decreased from 212
to 197 (Stockwell et al., 2011). However, with the BC liquor
distribution authority ﬁxing wholesale prices only slightly
below government liquor store prices (initially 10% lower,
rising to 16%) and the imposition of minimum retail prices,
private stores typically have sold alcohol at prices between
10% and 15% higher than in government stores—although
on any given day, the cheapest alcohol is usually available
from private stores (Stockwell et al., 2010).
Evidence has mounted in recent years that alcohol-pricing
policies can be highly effective policy tools for reducing
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alcohol-related harms (Babor et al., 2010; Wagenaar et al.,
2009a, 2009b). Furthermore, strong theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence has emerged to suggest that minimum pricing
in particular may be a powerful tool for reducing hazardous
consumption (Gruenewald et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2014;
Purshouse et al., 2010) and alcohol-related harm (Stockwell
et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013). These studies suggest that
cheaper products (a) are preferred by hazardous drinkers and
(b) display greater price sensitivities than do higher priced
alcohol products.
These examples of evolving alcohol policies raise the
question as to how effectively price controls can be used
to limit possible adverse effects on public health and safety
associated with liquor privatization and increased alcohol
availability. The present study uses BC as a case study of
a jurisdiction where almost simultaneously controls on the
physical availability of alcohol have been loosened while
government-set minimum prices have been periodically ad-
justed. Most recently, the government of BC has announced
a new approach to liquor policy involving fewer restrictions
on the places and times at which alcohol can be sold, along
with a comprehensive set of minimum prices to protect both
public safety and government revenues (British Columbia
Ministry of Justice, 2014). In this study, we analyzed archi-
val data to explore the relative effectiveness of changes to
physical availability and minimum alcohol prices as public
health policies. In previous studies, there have been indica-
tions that minimum alcohol prices may have far stronger
effects on rates of alcohol-related hospital admissions
(Stockwell et al., 2013) and deaths (Zhao et al., 2013) than
do levels of liquor outlet density. In the present study, we
explored this question in relation to crime outcomes and
compared those identiﬁed as, or known to be, alcohol related
with those designated as non–alcohol related.
The speciﬁc objectives of this study are to investigate
the association of alcohol-involved traffic violations,
non–alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations, and crimes against
persons with alcohol outlet densities and minimum alcohol
prices. Here we propose two hypotheses: (a) Changes in the
real value of minimum prices will be negatively associated
with rates of alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations (but not
non–alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations) and crimes against
persons. (b) Densities of privately owned and operated out-
lets that sell alcohol should be positively associated with
rates of alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations and crimes against
persons.
On September 20, 2010, BC introduced new impaired-
driving legislation that simpliﬁed enforcement processes
and enabled civil penalties to be imposed immediately on
offenders. The introduction of this legislation was preceded
by much public debate in the media. An evaluation of these
new laws found them to be effective in reducing alcohol-
related trafﬁc violations (Macdonald et al., 2013). As a
consequence, although it only directly affected the last 3
months of the period used in the present study, it was de-
cided to adjust for the possible effects of this new policy in
the foregoing analyses.
Method
Study design
A cross-sectional versus time-series design (Beck, 2001;
Kervin, 1992) was used to investigate associations of alcohol
outlet densities and periodic increases to minimum prices of
different beverages with rates of alcohol-related crimes and
violations while adjusting for confounding effects of trend,
local socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (age
and sex, family income, percentage of aboriginal popula-
tion, and population density), regional differences, and
temporal autocorrelation. Yearly data were collated from 89
geographic regions deﬁning local health areas (LHAs) nested
within 16 health service delivery areas (HSDAs) for 9 cal-
endar years from January 1, 2002, until December 31, 2010.
These are administrative areas deﬁned by the BC Ministry of
Health for the delivery of local and regional health services.
Data sources
Crime incidents. Annual counts of crime incidents
(charges or arrests) by LHAs were received from BC Stats.
The data were aggregated into alcohol-involved trafﬁc vio-
lations, non–alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations, and crimes
against persons for the years 2002–2010 as outlined in Table
1. Annual crime rates per 100,000 persons age 15 years and
older for each LHA were calculated and modeled.
Minimum alcohol prices. Rates of minimum prices for
speciﬁc beverage types and dates when they were changed
were obtained from the BC Liquor Distribution Branch
(LDB) (Stockwell et al., 2012). Minimum prices increased
from $25.91 to $27.00 per liter of distilled spirits in August
2004, to $28.33 in September 2006, to $29.33 in January
2008, and to $30.66 in April 2009. (All prices are in Ca-
nadian dollars. At press time, CAD $1.00 = USD $0.79.)
Minimum prices for packaged and draft beers increased from
$3.00 and $2.05 per liter, respectively, to $3.47 and $2.18 in
May 2006, next rising to $3.54 and $2.22 in January 2008.
Minimum prices for liqueurs, coolers, and wines remained
unchanged. Annual consumer price index (CPI)–adjusted
average minimum prices per standard drink were computed
for each of these beverage types based on the proportion of
each year that a minimum price level was in effect. These
beverage-speciﬁc series were then averaged into a single
minimum price series across beverage types weighted by
overall proportion of sales over the complete study period.
The relationship between the rates of crimes and mean mini-
mum alcohol price for all beverages was investigated.
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Alcohol outlet data. Alcohol outlet data were also ob-
tained from the LDB for restaurants, bars, government liquor
stores, and private liquor stores. Grocery stores were not
permitted to sell alcohol during this period. Annual popula-
tion rates (stores/100,000 population age ≥15 years) were
calculated for each LHA, and the associations of these rates
with crime rates were examined.
Population data. Provincial population data, classiﬁed
into 89 LHAs, were obtained from BC Stats (2012) to cal-
culate crime rates and alcohol outlet densities per 100,000
adults age 15 years or older per LHA for each year. The
percentages of the population age 20–29 years old and males
in the population in each LHA per year were also computed
based on the estimated population obtained from BC Stats
(2012) and were included as covariates in the analyses.
Socioeconomic and demographic data. Several socio-
economic and demographic variables were included in the
analyses, being selected for their potential to confound the
main relationships of interest (Gruenewald & Ponicki, 1995;
Gruenewald et al., 1995; Holder & Parker, 1992; Sloan et
al., 1994; Stockwell et al., 2011). Time-invariant census
variables available from the 2006 census for each LHA
(Statistics Canada, 2006) included percentages of aborigi-
nal people and mean family income. The annual population
density was calculated as estimated total population in each
LHA for each year divided by land area (km2). These three
covariates were included in the analyses.
Statistical analyses
Annual rates of crime incidents were analyzed to exam-
ine trend changes using bivariate regression (Cody & Smith,
1991). Mixed models were used to investigate the associa-
tion of minimum alcohol prices and densities of four types
of alcohol outlets (private liquor stores, government liquor
stores, restaurants, and bars) with three types of crime
outcomes (alcohol-involved trafﬁc violation, non–alcohol-
involved trafﬁc violation, crimes against persons, and total
counts of three types of crime) after controlling for potential
confounders. Potential sociodemographic and economic
confounding characteristics at the LHA level included
population density, average household income, and the
proportions of the population that were (respectively) ages
20–29 years and male. The models also included controls
for temporal autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. We ex-
amined the interaction effects of minimum prices and outlet
densities but did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant interaction terms in
the models.
Mixed models were used (Laird & Ware, 1982), which
provide straightforward but ﬂexible methods for assessing
regional and temporal dynamics of longitudinal panels of
data. More orthodox autoregressive integrated moving aver-
age (ARIMA) models were not appropriate for these data be-
cause of (a) the need to adjust for variation in outlet density
and other covariates across 89 geographic areas and (b) the
availability of only nine time periods. Mixed models permit
tests of ﬁxed effects through either maximum likelihood or
restricted maximum likelihood estimation. These methods
are superior to traditional repeated-measures analysis of
variance because they (a) allow simultaneous inference about
regional and temporal factors through the use of ﬁxed and
random effects and (b) apply to a wide variety of covariance
(correlation) structures. This means that more appropriate
covariance data structures can be analyzed. Regional as
well as temporal autocorrelation effects were included in all
models. Log transformations were applied where necessary
to correct for signiﬁcantly skewed distributions and make
the variance stationary for dependent variables. The rates
of the crimes, minimum alcohol price, and rates of outlet
densities were log-transformed. As a result, the coefﬁcients
can be interpreted as the percentage change in the rates of
crimes resulting from a 1% increase in minimum prices and
outlet densities (Chaloupka et al., 2002). The equation for
the mixed models was as follows:
TABLE 1. Categories of alcohol-attributable crimes or violations in British Columbia, 2002–2010
Alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations
Impaired operations (alcohol) causing death, impaired operation (alcohol) causing bodily harm, impaired operation (alcohol) of motor vehicle, vessel or
aircraft, impaired operation, failure to provide breath sample, impaired operation, failure to provide blood sample of alcohol
Non–alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations
Impaired operation (drugs) causing death, impaired operation (drugs) causing bodily harm, impaired operation (drugs) vehicle, vessel, aircraft, impaired
operation, failure to provide breath sample of drugs, failure to comply or refusal (drugs), and failure to provide blood sample (drugs), total other Criminal
Code trafﬁc violations such dangerous operations causing death and bodily harm, dangerous operation of motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft, dangerous opera-
tion evading police causing death and bodily harm, dangerous operation of motor vehicle evading police, failure to stop or remain, driving while prohibited,
other Criminal Code trafﬁc violations, causing bodily harm by criminal negligence while street racing, dangerous operation causing bodily harm while street
racing, dangerous operation of motor vehicle while street racing
Crimes against persons
Homicide, total other violations causing death, attempted murder, sexual assaults (Level 1–3), weapon or bodily harm, sexual violations against children,
sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, luring a child via a computer, assaults (Level 1–3), total other assaults, total ﬁrearms (use
of, discharge, pointing), total robbery, total forcible conﬁnement or kidnapping, total abduction, extortion, criminal harassment, uttering threats, threatening
or harassing phone calls, total other violent violations
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Yit = β0 + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3X3it + β4X4it + β5X5it
+ β6X6it + β7X7it + β8X8it + β9X9it + β10X10t + β11X11t
+ ui + τt + εit,
where i = 1–89 for each LHA, t = 1–9 for each time period,
and k = 1–16 index values for each HSDA; Yitk is the natural
log-transformed rate of alcohol-involved trafﬁc violation,
for example, at the ith LHA and kth HSDA at the tth year; β0
is the intercept; β1 is the percent change in the rate of vio-
lations due to a 1% increase in minimum price; X1itk is the
log-transformed CPI-adjusted minimum price (Canadian dol-
lars) per standard drink; and coefﬁcients β2 to β9 represent
the percent change in the rate of alcohol violations resulting
from 1% increases in outlet variables (i.e., the density of
restaurants, government stores, private stores, and bars) and
all other independent variables (percentage of males in the
population, percentage of the population that is ages 20–29
years, mean household income, and population density),
the values for which are all represented by X2itk to X9itk (all
log-transformed measures). In addition, β10 is the estimated
effect of the 2010 impaired driving law reforms X10t (after
vs. before), β11 is the estimated effect for the trend X11t (i.e.,
year), νk is the variance component for HSDA, ui is the vari-
ance component for LHA, τit is the temporal autocorrelation
effect, and εitk is the error term.
All statistical analyses were conducted using SAS 9.3
(SAS Institute; Cary, NC, 2011). All signiﬁcance tests as-
sumed two-tailed p values or 95% conﬁdence intervals
(CIs).
Results
Table 2 presents estimates of associations between the
mean minimum price across all beverages, outlet densi-
ties, rates of the three types of crime events, and the overall
rate of all three crime types combined after adjustment for
demographic and economic variables. A 10% increase in
average minimum price (dollars per standard drink) for all
the beverages was estimated to be signiﬁcantly associated
with a 9.39% reduction (95% CI ±3.80%, p < .001) in the
rate of all three crime types, an 18.81% reduction (95% CI
±17.99%, p < .05) in alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations, and
9.17% reduction (95% CI ±5.95%, p < .01) in crimes against
persons. Figures 1 and 2 present trends in the rates of mean
annual alcohol-involved trafﬁc violations and crimes against
persons for all 89 LHAs compared with trends in the mean
CPI-adjusted value of minimum alcohol prices over time,
indicating mostly decreasing trends in both crime outcomes
as average minimum prices increased. A 10% increase in
private liquor store density was associated with a 1.91%
(95% CI ±1.74%, p < .05) increase in non–alcohol-involved
trafﬁc violations. When terms were introduced into these
models for interactions between the effects of minimum
pricing and outlet density, these were not signiﬁcant and so
are not reported here.
The models also conﬁrmed signiﬁcant associations with
some sociodemographic variables and some crime outcomes,
as well as the presence of regional effects in both the small
(LHA) and larger (HSDA) areas. For example, average fam-
TABLE 2. Associations of alcohol outlet density and average minimum price for all beverages with the rates of crime in British Columbia, 2002–2010
Total trafﬁc violations & Alcohol-involved Non–alcohol-involved
crimes against the persona trafﬁc violationa trafﬁc violationa Crimes against the persona
Variables Est. 95% CI Pr > |t| Est. 95% CI Pr > |t| Est. 95% CI Pr > |t| Est. 95% CI Pr > |t|
Minimum prices -0.939 ±0.380 .0001 -1.881 ±1.799 .0405 2.811 ±4.296 .1994 -0.917 ±0.595 .0026
Restaurants -0.042 ±0.103 .4259 -0.043 ±0.058 .1447 -0.016 ±0.026 .2405 -0.036 ±0.106 .5068
Government liquor stores -0.014 ±0.078 .7157 0.024 ±0.091 .6092 0.032 ±0.105 .5458 -0.027 ±0.074 .4742
Bars -0.083’ ±0.099 .1015 0.001 ±0.167 .9944 -0.168 ±0.173 .0574 -0.075 ±0.096 .1225
Private liquor stores 0.104 ±0.125 .1028 0.022 ±0.222 .8435 0.191 ±0.174 .0316 0.105 ±0.127 .1070
Year -0.016 ±0.010 .0013 0.041 ±0.025 .0018 -0.007 ±0.033 .6899 -0.026 ±0.010 .0001
% of 20–29 population 0.512 ±0.233 .0001 0.502 ±0.244 .0001 0.561 ±0.543 .0429 0.518 ±0.258 .0001
% of males in the population 0.678 ±1.341 .3213 0.418 ±1.715 .6323 0.129 ±2.991 .9326 0.099 ±1.265 .8776
Population density -0.096 ±0.016 .0001 -0.140 ±0.023 .0001 -0.044 ±0.045 .0602 -0.093 ±0.022 .0001
Average family income -0.353 ±0.367 .0592 0.227 ±0.467 .3410 -0.089 ±0.419 .6763 -0.580 ±0.446 .0109
2010 Impaired driving law -0.075 ±0.050 .0032 -0.118 ±0.099 .0196 -0.131 ±0.145 .0766 -0.063 ±0.053 .0196
Covariance parameter estimates
Random effect variables Est. SE Pr > Z Est. SE Pr > Z Est. SE Pr > Z Est. SE Pr > Z
HSDAs (Level 2) 0.018 0.011 .0521 0.003 0.008 .3479 0.067 0.034 .0277 0.034 0.018 .0295
LHAs (Level 1) 0.039 0.012 .0004 0.061 0.020 .0013 0.055 0.020 .0037 0.052 0.013 .0004
Autoregressive effect at level 0.705 0.054 .0001 0.563 0.045 .0001 0.406 0.044 .0001 0.624 0.057 .0001
Residual 0.046 0.008 .0001 0.156 0.016 .0001 0.229 0.017 .0001 0.044 0.006 .0001
Notes: Est. = estimate; HSDAs = health service delivery areas; LHAs = local health areas. Bold indicates estimates signiﬁcant at p < .05 level. aEstimates are
interpreted as percent changes in annual crime or violation rates as minimum alcohol prices and each of the other covariates increase by 1%. All the estimates
in mixed models (alcohol-involved trafﬁc violation, non–alcohol-involved trafﬁc violation, and crimes against the person) were adjusted for variation between
HSDAs and LHAs and time series autoregressive effects. Pr > |t| = p value of t test; Pr > Z = p value of F test.
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FIGURE 1. Annual alcohol-involved trafﬁc violation rate per 100,000 population ages ≥ 15 and minimum alcohol price (consumer price index–adjusted Ca-
nadian dollars per drink) in British Columbia in 2002–2010
FIGURE 2. Annual rate of crimes against person per 100,000 population ages ≥ 15 and consumer price index–adjusted minimum alcohol price (Canadian
dollars per drink) in British Columbia in 2002–2010
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ily income was negatively associated with crimes against
persons. The percentages of the population ages 20–29 years
were positively associated with both rates of trafﬁc viola-
tions and crimes against persons. In addition, the models
conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant reduction in alcohol-related trafﬁc
violations but not non–alcohol-related trafﬁc violations asso-
ciated with the introduction of new impaired driving laws in
BC at the end of 2010 as reported in more detailed analyses
of longer time series (Macdonald et al., 2013).
Discussion
The recent history of alcohol control policies in the Unit-
ed States and Canada has been typiﬁed by the dismantling of
governmental monopolization and increased privatization. In
this study of one Canadian province, no association was ob-
served between increased densities of private liquor outlets
(brought about by privatization) and rates of alcohol-related
crime events. However, strong associations were observed
between the values of minimum alcohol prices and both
alcohol-related trafﬁc violations and crimes against persons.
This is consistent with earlier ﬁndings concerning associa-
tions between minimum alcohol prices in BC and rates of
acute alcohol-related hospital admission and death (Stock-
well et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013).
These two policy measures were implemented simultane-
ously but perhaps with different degrees of impact on health
and safety: restrictions on outlet density were being loosened
while minimum prices were being periodically increased.
The analyses indicated that the impacts of minimum pric-
ing were substantial and signiﬁcant, whereas the effects of
increasing the density of liquor outlets were relatively weak.
Although private liquor store density was positively associ-
ated with each category of crime examined, this relationship
was only statistically signiﬁcant for non–alcohol-involved
trafﬁc violations. We note that in other more powerful analy-
ses with more time periods available, signiﬁcant positive
relationships were observed between the density of private
liquor stores and both morbidity and mortality outcomes
(Stockwell et al., 2011, 2013; Zhao et al., 2013). The sig-
niﬁcant effect of minimum price on alcohol-related trafﬁc
violations but not on non–alcohol-related citations, along
with the larger literature on alcohol pricing, consumption,
and harm (Wagenaar et al., 2009a, 2010), is consistent with
the interpretation that increases in minimum alcohol prices
can cause reductions in alcohol-related trafﬁc violations. The
earlier ﬁndings that increased minimum prices signiﬁcantly
and immediately reduce acute (injuries and poisonings) but
not chronic (dependence and diseases) alcohol-related hos-
pital admissions in the short term is also consistent with this
pattern of results (Stockwell et al., 2009).
The economic processes underlying the effects of mini-
mum prices on rates of alcohol-related harm are relatively
well understood (Gruenewald et al., 2006; Meier et al.,
2010). There is ample evidence that alcohol in general be-
haves like other commercially available products in the sense
that consumption is sensitive to price. For example, meta-
analyses indicate that a 10% increase in the average price
of alcohol is associated with a signiﬁcant 4%–5% decrease
in consumption (Gallet, 2007; Wagenaar et al., 2009a).
Gruenewald et al. (2006) analyzed the Swedish alcohol-
monopoly sales data and reported that, in general, the cheap-
est products were the most price sensitive (i.e., consumption
decreased the most for a given increase in price). Adding to
this, studies in the United Kingdom (Holmes et al., 2014)
and the United States (Kerr & Greenﬁeld, 2007) ﬁnd that
the heaviest consumers tend to select the cheapest alcohol
and therefore are likely to be most affected by increases in
minimum alcohol prices.
There are a number of possible mechanisms by which an
increase in the density of liquor stores may create some ad-
verse consequences for public health and safety (e.g., longer
operating hours, changes in days of sales, lax enforcement
of laws against selling to minors and intoxicated customers,
increased physical availability, discounting resulting from
price competition, and stocking of beverages associated with
risky use). It is possible that efﬁciently structured distribu-
tion systems may lead to increased external costs to both
individuals (including nondrinkers) in particular and the
broader society in general.
We note several limitations with this study. The units of
analysis varied greatly in geographic size and population,
raising questions about the comparability of population
distributions. We had a limited number of periods across
which to observe relationships (nine), albeit examined across
89 separate local areas in our models, and there were wide
95% CIs around our estimates of effect sizes. Further, we
report only associations between variables—not evidence of
causation—and other simultaneous events not included in
this study may better explain the relationships found. Our
measures of crime rates also captured a diverse range of
charges and arrests grouped into two broad categories: traf-
ﬁc violations and violent incidents. It is possible that these
reﬂect changes in levels and priorities in police enforcement
practices in addition to changes in underlying crime rates.
The use of non–alcohol-related trafﬁc violations, however,
does provide a degree of control for this possibility.
In conclusion, the present ﬁndings add to the growing
literature indicating that public health and safety beneﬁts can
ﬂow from policies that seek to limit cheap alcohol by setting
minimum prices. In earlier research (Stockwell et al., 2013;
Zhao et al., 2013), we reported substantially greater public
health and safety impacts of minimum alcohol pricing than
of changes to liquor outlet density caused by privatization.
Because government-controlled alcohol distribution systems
provide a means of regulating both alcohol prices and the
density of liquor outlets, these ﬁndings still support the idea
that government alcohol monopolies can have beneﬁcial im-
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pacts on public health and safety if they apply such policies
effectively. As a ﬁnal note, the BC government announced
a series of radical reforms in 2014 to permit the sale and
consumption of alcohol at more times and places along with
restrictions on liquor store density (no new stores within 1
km of an existing store) and a new set of minimum alcohol
prices for liquor stores and bars (BC Ministry of Justice,
2014). Future studies will be required to conﬁrm predicted
public health and safety beneﬁts from these measures.
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